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There is a certain well-defined acknowledged method of arriving at an understanding of natural laws through rational processes. The first step is to arrive at facts through observation and experiment, to critically compare and classify them, and from a study of particular cases to derive general laws. This is reasoning by induction. The next step is to compare remote phenomena with that near at hand. If we know that a certain phenomenon is, under given circumstances, produced by a given cause, we conclude that an identical phenomenon is always, under the same circumstances, produced by the same cause. This is called reasoning by analogy, and continues the inductive process.
The inductive method may be defined as a process of reasoning from the observed operation of a law to a knowledge of the law itself. The inverse of this method of reasoning is the deductive method—possessing a knowledge of the law, to arrive, through a rational process, at a knowledge of the phenomena which would be produced by the operation of the law. The inductive method is reasoning from effect to cause; the deductive method is reasoning from cause to effect.
It should be readily perceptible to the ordinary mind that an absolute knowledge of law is essential to the successful employment of this latter method. But what is today called the deductive method is begun by the formulation of a theory, an hypothesis, which assumes that certain laws operate to produce certain observed phenomena; and then an appeal is made to experience, to verify or negative the truth of the hypothesis. It is really jumping at a conclusion from a careless observation of phenomena, and then experimenting, more or less exhaustively, to prove the conclusion. It is guessing at law.
And then all the evidence which seems to favor the correctness of the guess is cherished, and all which tends to disprove it is slighted. The person who experiments to prove a theory is prejudiced in favor of his theory, and consequently unable to fairly weigh evidence. It was thus that the accepted theory of gravitation originated. It was thus the Copernican system of astronomy originated. These theories have never been demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt. Phenomena constantly occur in nature which cannot be explained according to these theories. Modern scientists are puzzled by many occurrences which seem to disprove their theories, and are consequently ever modifying their theories to fit new cases. And a bad piece of patchwork is the result. Modern science knows nothing absolutely. It gropes in a dim twilight.
In the thirteenth century Roger Bacon taught in England the supreme importance of experience as a basis of knowledge. This same doctrine was more forcefully and efficiently promulgated in the seventeenth century by the great Francis Bacon. Hence, reasoning by induction has been called the Baconian method of investigation.
Bacon taught that we should always begin by collecting facts, classifying them according to their agreement and difference, and gradually gathering from them laws of greater and greater generality. He always protested against what he designated “anticipating nature,” that is, forming theories as to what the laws of nature probably are, and endeavoring to account for natural phenomena by such theories. He said: “Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, can do and understand as much as he has observed concerning the order of nature in outward things and in the mind; more, he can neither know nor do.” And: “Human science and human power coincide, because ignorance of a cause deprives us of the effect. For nature is not conquered except by obedience; and what we discover as a cause by contemplation, becomes a rule in operation.” Tennyson has beautifully expressed this latter thought in the words, “Rule by obeying nature’s powers.”
Bacon’s method is discredited by our present day scientists—sciolists would be a better designation—and knowledge gained through experience is called empirical knowledge, and referred to with scorn. And yet it is through a preliminary empirical knowledge that these scornful ones formulate their theoretical knowledge.
The Greek word empiria means experience, trial. It was through such preliminary experience that Newton was led to the formulation of his theory of gravitation, which is considered the greatest result yet achieved by the guessing process of investigation; for he first believed that he had arrived at a knowledge of the law of terrestrial gravity through observation and experiment and the inductive process of reasoning. It was his failure here which led to the colossal absurdity of universal gravitation.
The reason of Newton’s failure to get at the truth of the law of gravity was that his experience was not complete. He did not begin by correctly observing and taking into consideration all the facts in the case. The inductive method of investigation, to be successful, must be thorough. To begin with, observation must be both accurate and exhaustive, or the conclusion will not be complete—it will not comprehend all the facts unless all the facts were considered in arriving at it. It is this lack of thoroughness which is responsible for rules followed by exceptions. And then, to keep its brazen countenance, ignorance formulates impudent aphorisms, and we have been told that “the exception proves the rule.”
Poor humanity has become so befuddled that it is well nigh impossible to find one mind sufficiently clear to grasp the truth that there is such a thing as absolute, undeviating law, and that this is not a haphazard universe in constant danger of accidental destruction, but a universe governed by eternal law, constantly wasting and constantly building up, the building process exactly balancing the wasting process, so that perpetuity of existence is the result.
If we observe an apple fall to the earth’s surface when its hold upon the branch is destroyed, and then experiment with different apples, and find that each, when released from a point above the surface of the earth, falls to the surface, are we justified by that experience in formulating the law that all apples when released fall to the earth’s surface? Let us consider this a little. The earth has a water as well as a land surface. If we take an apple some distance below the water surface and release it, it will rise to the earth’s surface. So the first statement is not true, because whether the apple falls to the surface or rises to the surface depends upon whether it is released from a point above or below that surface.
Again, if we conclude that all apples when released from a point above the earth’s surface fall to the surface, and experiment with a number of other objects and find that each when released falls to the earth’s surface, are we justified in concluding that all objects when released from a point above the earth’s surface fall to the surface? Take, for example, an apple, a wooden ball, and a toy balloon. Attach these three objects to the same point at some distance above the earth’s surface. Now release the three objects, and what results? The apple and the ball fall to the earth; but the balloon, which is an object just as much as the ball is an object, rises.
Divesting oneself of prejudice and observing this occurrence critically, it is observed that the apple and the ball appear to be no more attracted toward the earth than the balloon appears to be attracted in an opposite direction. The apple and the ball move eagerly toward the earth and the balloon moves just as eagerly in an opposite direction. The modern theory of gravity declares that the apple and the ball are pulled toward the earth, but that the air gets under the balloon and pushes it up. But no more reluctance is manifest in the balloon’s ascent than is manifest in the apple’s and the ball’s descent, and if the balloon is pushed up, why may not the ball and the apple be pushed down?
The theory of modern so-called science is insufficient to harmonize the fact of the balloon’s ascent with the fact of the ball’s and the apple’s descent, because the theory is formulated from a consideration of only one of these two facts.
From this it should be evident that in order to arrive at a knowledge of any law through the inductive method of investigation, it is absolutely necessary that all the possible phenomena occasioned by the operation of that law be accurately observed and critically considered—that all the facts be collected. If all the possible phenomena caused by the operation of a law could be considered, it would be possible to arrive, through the inductive process of reasoning, at a knowledge of the law; but if any essential phenomenon is omitted, the result will lack accuracy, and as the process is continued to greater and greater generalizations, the results will be farther and farther from the truth.
The reasoning may be logical, but, because the experience which constitutes the premise is incomplete, the result is false. The question will be asked, How is it possible to know whether all possible phenomena have been considered, unless one first knows what the result would be if all possible phenomena were considered? In other words, How is it possible to know whether all the operations of any law have been observed, without first a knowledge of the law? Or, in still other words, How are we to know whether we have seen all the effects of a given cause operating under every diversity of circumstance, unless we know what the given cause is? It is not possible. But when human experience is complete, it meets the sphere of the eternal God wisdom, and at the point of meeting, each complements the other, and absolute knowledge of truth is the result.
As modern science leaves God out of the question, and refuses to accept evidence from the Bible, we will in this instance appeal to the methods which modern science adopts, to prove our position. We claim to have a teacher who has arrived at the point of absolute knowledge of law. He presents to our consideration a system of cosmogony. It is not a theory at which he has guessed and of the truth of which he himself is in doubt. He declares his knowledge of its truth. He needs not to try experiments to prove its truth.
The celebrated Turgot said, and well expressed the condition of modern science, “The first thing is to invent a system; the second thing is to be disgusted with it.” This is to say, that every system should be put to a severe trial to discover possible points of failure. The founder of the Koreshan system of cosmogony has no need to put his system to the trial for his own benefit. He knows its truth. How he knows it need not concern us at present.
But as we have not attained to this point of absolute knowledge, and as we are to leave faith out of the question in this case, we must appeal to experience to verify or negative the truth of his system. If his system is the correct one, then all observed phenomena may be accounted for through a process of deductive reasoning from the laws which he formulates. And this system does not merely account for some of nature’s phenomena. It accounts for all possible phenomena.
This is the impregnable position of the Koreshan system of cosmogony. And we have the right to demand that our system be put to the test as have been other systems, before it be declared false. Other men have presented hypotheses—suppositions—guesses—to the world, and the world has not refused them a respectful hearing: Newton, Kepler, even Descartes was heard. Each of these men came saying, “I think.” Here comes a man who says to the world, “I know.”
And he declares his willingness to have his system subjected to the most severe tests, for he knows what must be the result of such tests. But because it proves the present so-called knowledge of the world to be foolishness, our present-day savants close their ears, and refuse to hear the truth. But truth will not long wander outcast, for “we will speak out, we will be heard, though all earth’s systems crack!”—E. M. Castle.
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The Flaming Sword · Vol. 9, No. 4 · · PDF pp. 4-6